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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Contracts-Modifications in Common Law
Joint Liability.*
At common law joint obligors had to be sued jointly' with a
few exceptions. 2 This strict rule was applied to parties who were
jointly liable on a bill or note3 and a few states still follow it. Others
have relaxed its severity.
* The general scope of this note is limited to the joinder and non-joinder
of co-obligors in an action on a joint contract or negotiable instrument. Some
consideration is given to substantive rules. There are a number of questions
which might arise concerning the general subject. For example, it might
be questioned whether the statutes making joint contracts joint and several
include negotiable instruments, as in Delaware, infra note 19. Also, a number
of states havQ a statute saying that "of the parties to the action, those who
are united in interest must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." This statute
is usually interpreted as referring to the necessity that all the plaintiffs have
the same interest and all the defendants likewise. It does not refer to the
necessary parties who must sue or be sued, but refers only to those who are
actually involved in the suit. N. C. CODE (Michie, 1931) §457 is a statute of
this type. On partnership liabilities, see Burdick, Joint and Several Liability
of Partners (1911) 11 CoL L. Rzv. 101. On notice to joint indorsers, see
note (1925) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 57. On the effect of the death of a joint obligor,
see (1929) 9 Oa. L. R.Ev. 76. As to payment to one joint payee, see Note
(1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 46.
11 CHITTrY, PLEADING 42; BLIss, LAw o, PLEADING (3d ed. 1894) §91;
CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 257; McIxTosH, N. C. PRAcriCE AND PRocEnuan (1929) §235; 20 R. C. L. 677; 8 C. J. 849; §1110; 47 C. J. 85, §169.
If only one joint obligor were sued, he could demur or plead in abatement for
non-joinder of necessary parties. If he did not object and plaintiff obtained
a judgment against him, the plaintiff lost his rights in regard to the other
joint obligors ;the judgment against one merged the debt of all. BLISS, op. cit.
supra §92. As to what are considered joint, several, and joint and several
promissory notes see: BIGELow, THE LAv OF BILLS, NoTEs AND CHECKS (3d

ed. 1928) §§162, 164; 8 C. J" 66-69, §§96-104. The Restatement of the law of
.contracts follows the common law. 1 CONTRACTs RESTA TMENT (Am. L.
Jnst. 1932) c. 5, pp. 129-150.
'If one of the joint obligorA was out of the jurisdiction or was under a
disability such as -infancy at the time of making the contract, or had been
discharged by operation of law after the contract had been made, or was a
dormant partner, plaintiff could sue the other joint obligors. CLARK, Coon
PLEADING (1928) 257-258 and cases there cited; same material, CLARK AND
BROWNELL, Joinder of Parties (1927)1 37 YALE L. J. 28, at 41-54.
3
RANDOLPH, COmmERCIAL PAIPm §1665; 8 C. J. 849, §1110.
"Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina have direct holdings which follow
the common law rule.
Nelson v. Ziegfeld, 131 So. 316 (Fla. 1930).
Graham v. Marks, 95 Ga. 38, 21 S. E. 986 (1894) ; Almand v. Hathcock, 140
Ga. 26, 78 S. E. 345 (1913) (prom. note) ; Gate City Cotton Mills v. Alexander,
143 Ga. 42, 43, 84 S. E. 118 (1915) ; Elrod v. Camp, Flanigan and Toole, 150
Ga. 48, 102 S. E. 357 (1920) ; Dickenson v. Hawes, 32 Ga. App. 173, 122 S.
E. 811 (1924); Exchange Bank of Savannah v. Harper, 35 Ga. App. 786,
134 S. E. 789 (1926) ; Smith v. Moore, 45 Ga. App. 708, 165 S. E. 765 (1932) ;
Locher v. Gray, 168 S. E. 909 (Ga. 1933). Georgia also holds that rendition
of a judgment against one of several joint obligors merges the entire cause
of action and bars any subsequent suit on the same contract against the other
debtors. Scarborough & Co. v. Yarborough, 13 Ga. App. 792, 79 S. E. 1131
(1913). An exception to the general rule is made by statute in Georgia pro-

NOTES AND COMMENTS
A number of states which still hold that joint obligors must be
sued jointly have added the provision that non-joinder can be taken
advantage of only by a plea in abatement or by demurrer ;5 otherwise the defendant will waive the defect. 6 The plaintiff can then
viding that the plaintiff may proceed by attachment against the joint obligor
who is liable to attachment, without making the other joint obligors parties
to his declaration in attachment. GA. CODE (Michie, 1926) §5067; Clark v.
Maddox, 41, Ga. App. 807, 154 S. E. 728 (1930). A note signed by apparent
principal makers reciting, "We promise to pay," is prima facie a joint undertaking, Locher v. Gray, supra. Also on the subject, see Evans v. Williams,
29 Ga. App. 126, 113 S.E. 703 (1922).
Boykin v. Watson'% Administrators, 3 Brev. 260 (S. C. 1812) (contract);
id., I Tread. Const. 157 (S. C. 1812); Ayer v. Wilson, 2 Mill, Const. 139,
12 Am. Dec. 677 (S. C. 1818) (contract) (non-joinder bars the action);
McCall v. Price, 1 McCord 82 (S.C. 1821) (bond). However, by statute if
the action is against two or more defendants jointly indebted upon contract
and the summons is served on one or more but not on all, the plaintiff may
proceed against the defendant served unless the court directs otherwise, [this
much of the statute was held constitutional in Allnut v. Lancaster, 76 Fed. 131
(C. C. D.S.C. 1896), and a statute similar to it in Hanley v. Donoghue, 116
U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242, 29 L. ed. 242 (1885)] and a judgment can be recovered
against all the defendants jointly which is enforceable against the joint property
of all and the separate property of the one served. S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932)
§438. See, also, infra note 15. It is also provided that if a judgment is so
obtained, those who were not originally summoned may be summoned to show
cause why they should not be bound in the same manner as if they had been
originally summoned. S., C. CODE (Michie, 1932) §810.
Idaho, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Wyoming probably also follow the common law.
An Idaho case contains the statement that a promissory note executed and
signed by two persons and reading "we promise to pay" is on its face a joint
and several liability. Tritthart v. Tritthart, 24 Idaho 186, 133 Pac. 121 (1913) ;
but an earlier case says that all parties jointly liable on a contract must be
made defendants in an action .on it. People v. Sloper, 1 Idaho 159 (1867)
(appearance bond). IDAHO CODE (Lee, Ross, and Lukens, 1932) §5-510 provides that if the action is against two or more defendants jointly liable on a
contract and the summons is served on one or more but not on all, the plaintiff
may proceed against the defendants served as if they were the only ones, and
by §12-201 if a judgment is recovered against those served, those not originally
summoned and not appearing may be summoned to show cause why they should
not be bound by the judgment.
Bazell v. Belcher, 31 Ohio St. 572 (1877); Hamilton v. Ohio State Bank
& Trust Co., 20 Ohio App. 493, 152 N. E. 731 (1925) (prom. note).
Wyoming, with a code of practice based on Ohio's, probably follows Ohio
on this point, Wyo.ComP. STAT. ANN. (1920) §§5531 to 6452, and see Fisher
v. Chadwick, 4 Wyo. 379, 34 Pac. 899 (1893).
The United States Supreme Court will dismiss an appeal if the judgment
sought to be reviewed is joint and both or all the joint parties do not join in
the appeal. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Bunn, 285 U. S. 169, 52
Sup. Ct. 354, 76 L. ed. 685 (1932), and will deny a writ of certiorari if the
judgment sought to be reviewed is joint and the record fails to disclose summons and severance. Missouri State Life Insurance Company v. Johnson, .53
Sup. Ct. 404, 77 L. ed. 655 (1933).
'As to the effect of these pleas, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 341,
342, 410-414.
' Bledsoe v. Irvin, 35 Ind. 293 (1871) (prom. note) ; Boots v. Boots, 84 Ind.
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proceed to judgment against the non-objecting defendarit, but with
either of two results: one group of states holds that such judgment
would merge the debt of the other obligors;7 another group has
passed laws providing that a judgment against one co-obligor does
not discharge the rest.8 Several states have statutes providing that
171 (1882); Sharp v. Baker, 51 Ind. App. 547, 99 N. E. 44 (1912) (prom.
note).
Dennett v. Chick, 2 Greenl. 176 (Me. 1823) (prom. note) ; Hughes v. Littlefield, 18 Me. 400 (1841) (prom. note) ; Hapgood v. Watson, 65 Me. 510 (1876)
(prom. note.) ; see also ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 95, §§105, 106.
Maurer v. Midmey, 25 Neb. 575, 41 N. W. 395 (1889) ; Beeler v. First Nat.
Bank of Lamed, 34 Neb. 348, 51 N. W. 857 (1892) (prom. note); Perkins
County v. Miller, 55 Neb. 141, 75 N. W. 577 (1898) (official bond); BatesNebraska
Smith Inv. Co. v. Scott, 56 Neb. 475, 76 N. W. 1063 (1898).
also provides that if service cannot be had on all, action may proceed against
those served. Fox v. Abbott, 12 Neb. 328, 11 N. W. 303 (1882) (action on
judgment); Bowen v. Crow, 16 Neb. 556, 20 N. W. 850 (1884); Council
Bluffs Say. Bank. v. Griswold, 50 Neb. 753, 70 N. W. 376 (1897) ; Gyger v.
Courtney, 59 Neb. 555, 81 N. W. 437 (1900) ; Young v. Joseph Bros. & Davidson, 5 Neb. (Unof.) 559, 99 N. W. 522 (1904) (bond) ; Wolfenburger v. Britt,
105 Neb. 773, 181 N. W. 932 (1921) ; the voluntary release of one of two joint
makers of a promissory note will release the other. Banking House of Castetter v. Rose, 78 Neb. 693, 111 N. W. 590 (1907). Where a judgment against
joint debtors is sought to be revived, all those jointly liable should be made
parties to the action; but where all are made parties and a summons is issued
against all, the fact that .one or more of the parties cannot be found will not
abate the action against those found and properly served. Clark v. Commercial
Nat. Bank of Columbus, 68 Neb. 764, 94 N. W. 958 (1903).
Markoe v. Seaver, 2 Wis. 148 (1853) (prom. note).
"Kamm v. Harker, 3 Ore. 208 (1870) (prom. note); Ryckman v. Manerud,
68 Ore. 350, 136 Pac. 826 (1913), Ann. Cas. 1915C 522; Anderson v. Stayton
State Bank, 82 Ore. 357,- 159 Pac. 1033 (1916).
WASH. ComP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) §143; Warren v. Rickles, 129 Wash.
443, 225 Pac. 422 (1924) ; Pacific Southwest Trust & Savings Bank v. Mayer,
138 Wash. 85, 244 Pac. 248 (1926). Also a joint judgment against two or
more persons for a tort committed by their employee, though reversed as to
one of the parties appealing, remains in force as against another not appealing. Shreeder v. Davis, 43 Wash. 129, 86 Pac. 198 (1906). Also a judgment
on a joint obligation is a bar to an action thereon against obligors not parties
judgment. Warren v. Rickles, 129 Wash. 443, 225 Pac. 422 (1924).
to the
8
MD. PuB. GEN. LAWS (1924) art. 50, §10; Brown v. Warram, 3 Harr.
& J. 572 (Md. 1815) (prom. note) ; Pike v. Dashiell's Adm'r., 7 Harr. &. J.
466 (Md. 1823) (prom. note) ; Merrick v. Trustees of Bank of Metropolis, 8
Gill 59 (Md. 1849) (prom. note) ; State v. Wheeler, 14 Md. 108 (1859) (official bond) ; Kent v. Holliday, 17 Md. 387 (1861) (bill of exchange) (and if
complaint shows there is a co-obligor, the non-joinder must be accounted for or
the complaint is bad) ; Lorrey v. Bailey, 43 Md. 10 (187$) ; Westheimer v.
Craig, 76 Md. 399, 25 Atl. 419 (1892) (contract); Rosenthal v. Heft, 159
Md. 302, 150 At. 850 (1930); on subject generally, see MD. PUB. GEN. LAWS
(1924) art. 26, §§14, 21; art. 50, §§1 through 12.
Robertson v. Smith, 18 Johns. 459, 9 Am. Dec. 227 (N. Y. 1821) ; Delaware
County Nat. Bank v. King, 109 App. Div. 553, 95 N. Y. Supp. 956 (1905);
Jones v. Gould, 200 N. Y. 18, 92 N. E. 1071 (1910) ; Trusts & Guarantee Co.
v. Sawyer, 146 App. Div. 63, 130 N. Y. Supp. 582 (1911); Hawksworth v.
Durant, 93 Misc. Rep. 149, 156 N. Y. Supp. 1026 (1916) (contract); O'Con-
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an action cannot be abated or defeated for non-joinder of defendants. 9 Three states further provide that the court can order the
other co-obligors joined, apparently on its own motion ;10 and one
state allows a defendant named in any action to sue out, as of course,
a writ of scire facias to bring upon the record as an additional defendant any other person alleged to be jointly liable with him and
the suit then proceeds as though all of the parties had originally
been joined. 1 Other states which still require that co-obligors be
joined in an action have other variations of the common law rule
in that: (1) if all the joint obligors are not summoned and plaintiff
obtains judgment against those summoned, he may later proceed
nell v. Ryan, 127 Misc. Rep. 350, 216 N. Y. Supp. 590 (1926); N. Y. CoNs.
LAws (Cahill, 1930) ch. 12, §232.
Keller v. Blasdell, 1 Nev. 491 (1865); NaV. ComP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929)
§3701.
Miller v. Reed, 27 Pa. St. 244 (1856); Mintz v. Tri-County Natural Gas
Co., 259 Pa. 477, 103 AtI. 285 (1918) ; PA. STAT. (1920) §§12798, 12799, 12803,
16643, 16646, 16652.
UTAH, LAWS 1929, c. 61, §2. Also, in Utah, if the action is against two
or more defendants jointly liable and all are not served, the plaintiff may proceed to judgment against the one or ones served, UTAH COMP. LAWS (1917)
§6558, and then the others may be summoned to show cause why they should
not be bound by the judgment, Id. §6874.
VT. GEN. LAWS (1917) §§1827, 1928. However, in Vermont, the common
law rule that the death of a joint promisor left the survivor liable for the
whole debt, which rule applies to the husband and wife when joint debtors, is
still in effect. Congdon v. Torrey, 95 Vt. 38, 112 Atl. 202 (1921).
Wis. STAT. (1931) §113.02.
'CONN. GEN.

STAT.

(1930) §5646.

ComP. LAWS (1929). §14021. See also on this subject, Searles v.
Reed, 63 Mich. 485, 29 N. W. 884 (1886) ; Dumanoise v. Townsend, 80 Mich.
302, 45 N. W. 179 at 180 (1890); Dillenbeck v. Simons, 105 Mich. 373, 63
N. W. 438 (1895) ; Beasore v. Stevens, 155 Mich. 414, 119 N. W. 431 (1909)
McKnight v. Lowitz, 196 Mich. 368, 163 N. W. 94 (1917).
N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926) c. 334, §10.
Bright v. Hand, 16 N. J. L. 273 (1837); Grazioso v. Hirschfield, 128 Atl.
541 (N. J. 1925) ; Lieberman v. Brothan, 55 N. J. L. 379 26 Atl. 828 (1893)
(prom. note); Blessing v. McLinden, 81 N. J. L. 379, 79 Atl. 347 (1911);
Lapayowker v. Levitzky, 130 Atl. 627 (N. J. 1925) ; N. 1. ComP. STAT. (Supp.
1924) §163-285.
N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT (Cahill, 1931) §192; O'Connell v. Ryan, 127 Misc.
Rep. 350, 216 N. Y. Supp. 590 (1926) ; see also supra note 8.
Providence County Savings Bank v. Vadrias, 25 R. I. 295, 55 AtI. 754
(1903); R. I. GNai. LAWS (1923) §4871.
VT. GEN. LAWS (1917) §§1798, 1830; see also supra note 8.
VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §6102; see also infra note 17.
W. VA. CODE (1930) c. 56, art. 4, §34.
" N. J. ComP. STAT. (Supp. 1924) §163-284; see also Blessing v. McLinden, 81 N. J. L. 379, 79 Atl. 347 (1911) ; and supra note 9.
R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) §4871; see also supra note 9.
VT. GEN. LAWS (1917) §1830; see also supra notes 8, 9.
'Act of June 22, 1931. Pa. P. L. 663 (No. 236) ; see also supra note 8.
Micr.
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against the rest as though they were alone liable ;12 or (2) if the
action is against two or more jointly liable and all are not served,
a judgment may be rendered against all which is good against the
joint property of all and the individual property of the ones served,&
and when the judgment is docketed, those not summoned may be
ordered to show cause why they should not be bound ;14 or (3) one
of several joint obligors can confess judgment whether or not the
others have been served with a summons, and it is enforceable against
the joint property of all and the separate property of the one confessing. 15
One state has a law providing that a principal obligor in a contract may be sued either alone or jointly with any other partly liable
thereon. 16
A group of states, even more liberal, has enacted procedural statutes providing that a plaintiff may sue any one or more of the parties to a joint contract,' 7 with three more states adding a further
'

IND. ANN. STAT.

(Burns, 1926) §§340, 341; Martin v. Baugh, 1 Ind. App.

20, 27 N. E. 110 (1891)

(prom. note); Capital City Dairy Co. v. Plummer,

20 Ind. App. 408, 49 N. E. 963 (1898) (prom. note) ; see also supra note 6.
' WASH. COMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) §236; see also supra note 7.
!'WASH.

Comp.

STAT.

(Remington, 1922) §436; see also mtpra notes 7, 13.

1 Ona. CoDE ANN. (1930) §2-1203; see also supra note 7.

South Carolina, supra note 4, and Washington, supra note 13, have similar

statutes as well as New York, N. Y. Civir Pa~c. AcT (Cahill, 1931) §§11971201, and North Carolina, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §497. They all

provide in substance that if the action is against several jointly liable and all

are not served, a judgment can be rendered good against the joint property of
all and the individual property of those served. It is questioned whether these
statutes are constitutional if applied to any joint debtors except partners in.
that they seem to allow a plaintiff to deprive a joint debtor of his share of
joint property without giving him a day in court. For, as said in a comment
in (1926) 26 CoL L. REv. 771, at 772, "although serving one partner might be
sufficient notice to the others of an action against the firm, it seems clear that
service upon one of several persons who are connected only by the fact that
they became jointly indebted in one transaction cannot be sufficient notice to.
those not served that the plaintiff is trying to procure a judgment which can
be executed against, and is a lien on, all the property which they own jointly
with him who was served."
' TEx. Ray. Civ. CoDE (Vernon, 1925) art. 1986; Hinchman v. Riggins, I
White & W. Civ. Cas. Ct.-App. §§294 & 295 (Tex. 1882); Miller v. Sullivan,
89 Tex. 480, 35 S. W. 362 (1896) ; Brainerd v. Bute, 93 Tex. 137, 44 S. W. 575
(1898), 53 S. W. 1017 (1899); Clark v. Turk, 50 S. W. 1070 (Tex. 1899)
(contract); McDonald v. Cabiness, 100 Tex. 615, 102 S. W. 721 (1907) (contract).
'T IowA CoDE (1927) §10975 (including parties to negotiable paker) ; Poole,
Gillam & Co. v. Hintrager, 60 Iowa 180, 14 N. W. 223 (1882) ; Cole v. Harvey, 142 Iowa 574, 120 N. W. 97 (1909) (contract).
Ky. CODES ANN. (Carroll, 1932) Civil Prac. §27; Hughes v. Gray, 1 Ky.
Opin. 1 (1866) ; Gossom v. Badgett, 6 Bush 97 (Ky. 1869) (bill of exchange) ;.
Williams v. Rogers, 14 Bush 776 (Ky. 1879); Daugherty v. Bell Nat. Bank,
175 Ky. 513, 194 S. W. 545 (1917) (prom. note).
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Sec. 2 of Act 103 of 1870, printed at p. 19 of Acts of Louisiana of 1871,
reads: "Hereafter, in all suits against joint obligors it shall be unnecessary
to make all the obligors parties to the suit, but each of the joint obligors may
be sued and judgment obtained against them separately for the proportion of
the debt or obligation due by them respectively, whether all are joined in the
suit or not." This is also §1932 of the LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932). According to Alpha v. Rose, 171 La. 753, 132 So. 222 (1931), the law in
Louisiana is that it is not necessary to make ll the joint obligors parties to a
suit on a joint obligation; see also Carolina Portland Cement Company v.
Southern Wood Distillates and Fiber Company, 137 La. 469, 68 So. 831 at 833
(1915). However, there seems to be some confusion on this point so far as
-the statutes are concerned. Sec. 2085 of the LA. Civ. CODE (Dart, 1932) reads:
"In every suit on a joint contract, all the obligors must be made defendants,
.and no judgment can be obtained against any, unless it be proved that all
joined in the obligation, or are by law presumed to have done so." This is
the same as §2080 of the CODE of 1825 and is as enacted in the REV. Civ. CODE
-of 1870. There are a number of annotations under this section, but they are
of cases before 1871. The following two sections of the CODE (Dart, 1932)
.also refer to joint obligors: §2086 says that the judgment on joint obligations
.must be rendered against each defendant separately for his proportion of the
debt, and §2087, that even though one of the joint olligors has performed his
part he must be joined in the suit. The only reference at this place in the
CIV. CODE as published in 1932 to the present law is the first annotation which
reads "obligors sued separately, see Dart's Stat. 1932, §1932." Thus, a person
unfamiliar with Louisiana law would be led to believe by looking at the CODE
that Louisiana still has what is substantially the English common law rule.
And a person using the GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) to find law on this point
would have difficulty because §1932 is indexed under "bonds," subdivision
"judicial proceedings," further subdivision "separate action against joint
obligors."
Further confusion arises from the fact that Act 103 of 1870, referred to
supra, is entitled "Relative to bonds taken in cases of arrest, attachment,
sequestration and provisional seizure, and to suits against joint obligors." The
first section of the Act [which is §1931 of the GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932)] concerns the giving of bonds as indicated by the title. Now the question arises
as to whether §2 of the Act refers to all joint obligations or only to joint
'bonds given under §1. (and in the GEN. STAT. §1932 is* titled "Parties to
suit on bonds") or whether §3 of Act 103 of 1870 which repeals all laws in
conflict with the provisions of the Act repeals not only §2085 of the CODE but
.also §§2086 and 2087.
GEN. STAT. §1932 does not have the usual effect when a suit against one
of several joint obligors is allowed because the suit must be against the joint
debtor for his proportion of the debt. In Alpha v. Rose, supra, the plaintiff
'brought suit against one of two joint debtors for one-half of unpaid attorney's
fees.
However, the joint obligation seems to be seldom used in Louisiana any
-more; and when there are two or more obligors, they are generally bound
-either severally or in solido, thus eliminating this problem if a lawyer draws
the contract (letter from Louisiana attorney to writer).
Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) §2028; Thompson v. The Planters' Bank, 2
Smedes & M. 476 (Miss. 1844) (prom. note); Crump & Co. v. Wooten, 41
Miss. 611 (1868) (prom. note); White's Garage v. Boyd, 149 Miss. 383, 115
'So. 334 (1928).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §459; Davis v. Sanderlin, 23 N. C. 389
(1841) (prom. note); Lane v. Richardson, 79 N. C. 159 (1878); Rufty v.
Claywell, Powell & Co., 93 N. C. 306 (1885).
Sec. 459 of the N. C. CODE (Michie, 1931) was originally passed in 1797 and
then read, "That in all cases of joint obligations, or assumptions of co-partvers in trade, or others, such suits may be brought, and prosecuted on the
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and desirable provision for joining the other parties or consolidat8
ing the actions under some circumstances.'
A number of states have passed statutes changing the common
law conception of joint contracts as a matter of substantive law and
have thus affected. the procedure. Some declare that joint obligasame against the whole, or any one or more of such persons making such obligations, assumptions, or agreements; any law or usage heretofore to the contrary notwithstanding." P. L. 1797, c. 475, §2. This was in force, with
various slight changes in the wording, until 1868 when it was left out of the
Code of Civil Procedure adopted in that year. This omission was pointed out
in Merwin v. Ballard, .66 N. C. 168 (1871), and the legislature of 1871-72 then
passed the statute as it is to-day. P. L. 1871-72, c. 24, §1.
There are promissory notes used in North Carolina which contain, among
other things, provisions that "each of the makers, endorsers, sureties and
guarantors hereof hereby agrees that in the event any suit . . . may be instituted or prosecuted in any Court to enforce the payment of this obligation

. .

such suit may be

.

. prosecuted against such of said makers . . .

as the holder hereof may elect to sue or proceed against, and the one or ones
so sued or proceeded against hereby expressly waive the right to require that
any other maker . . . shall be made a party to any such suit." (Author's
italics). The first provision merely says what is provided by §459 of the N. C.
CODE, supra. But the latter provision, in italics, seems to interfere with the
Court and attempt to restrict its power to add parties. It would seem that
this provision is of no effect because if the one sued does violate his agreement and ask to have another party joined and the plaintiff objects, the Court
can nevertheless in the exercise of its discretion order the other parties td
be joined and disregard the plaintiff's objection. See N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §460. And in jurisdictions like Arizona, the District of Columbia, Minnesota, and Rhode Island, where the Court is specifically given
power to order additional parties who are liable to be brought in, this provision would seem to be of.no value.
VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §§6263, 6265; Colley v. Summers Parrott
Hardware Co., 119 Va. 439, 89 S.E. 906 (1916) (prom. note); Reed & Rice
Co. v. Wood, 138 Va. 187, 120 S. E. 874 (1924) (contract) ; see also supra
note 9.
Aiuz. CoDE (Struckmeyer, 1928) §3836:

" ...

the Court may, however,

require the plaintiff to bring in as defendants all parties jointly liable on the
obligation in the action, and any subsequent judgment shall be for the amount
unsatisfied." U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Alfalfa Seed & Lumber Co.,
38 Ariz. 48, 297 Pac. 862 (1931) (contractor's bond).
D. C. CODE (1929) tit 24, c. 10, §261 makes joint obligations joint and
several; by id. tit. 24, c. 9, §251, plaintiff may sue one of several joint obligors,
"but if separate actions be brought unnecessarily against the several parties
to such contract, the said actions may on motion be consolidated, and the
plaintiff shall be allowed the costs of one action only." Burdette v. Bartlett,
95 U. S. 637, 24 L. ed. 534 (1877) ; White v. Connecticut General Life Ins.
Co., 34 D. C. App. 460 (1910) (prom. note).
Under MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §9411, plaintiff may sue one or more
of joint obligors, including parties to negotiable paper, ..."provided, that
the Court, upon its own motion or on application of any interested party, may
require the plaintiff to bring in as defendants all the parties jointly liable on
the obligation in suit." Sundberg v. Goar, 92 Minn. 143, 99 N. W. 638 at 639
(1904) (bond); Hoatson v. McDonald, 97 Minn. 201, 106 N. W. 311 (1906) ;
Frykland v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 101 Minn. 37, 111 N. W. 727 (1907);
Morgan v. Brach, 104 Minn. 247, 116 N. W. 490 (1908) (contract) ; Singer
v. Singer, 173 Minn. 57, 214 N. W. 778, 216 N. W. 789 (1927).
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tions are to be construed as though they were joint and several. 1 9
Others have provided that "where.all the parties who unite in a promise receive some benefit from the consideration, whether past or present, their promise is presumed to be joint and several," 20° although
' Aax. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) §6229; Johnson v. Byrd,
Fed. Cas. No. 7,376 (1841) (prom. note); Hamilton v. Buxton, 6 Ark. 24

(1845) (contract), Walker & Faulkner v. Walker, 7 Ark. 541 (1846) (bill
of exchange); Burgen v. Dwinal, 11 Ark. 314 (1851) (contract) ; Hicks v.
Branton, 21 Ark. 186 (1860) (contract) ; Bradford & Co. v. Toney, 30 Ark.
763 (1875) (prom. note) ; Sawin v. Kenny, 93 U. S. 289, 23 L. ed. 926 (1876)
(contract); Meledon v. Leflore, 62 Ark. 387, 35 S. W. 1102 (1896) (prom.
note); LaMew v. Wilson-Ward Co., 106 Ark. 340, 153 S. W. 261 (1913)
(prom. note); Heard v. Farmers' Bank of Hardy, 295 S. W. 38 (Ark. 1927)
(prom. note).
COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) §4155; Mattison v. Childs, 5 Colo. 78
(1879) (prom. note); Hughes v. Fisher, 10 Colo. 383, 15 Pac. 702 (1887);
Hamill v. Ward, 14 Colo. 277, 23 Pac. 33Q (1890) (prom. note) ; Warren v.
Hall, 20 Colo. 508, 38 Pac. 767 (1894); Smith v. Woodward, 51 Colo. 311,
117 Pac. 140 (1911). However, this rule seems to be restricted in the case
of a partnership obligation in that a judgment on it must be rendered against
the co-partnership jointly and the partner summoned or appearing, whether
the summons is served on all or one or more. Jones v. Langhorne, 19 Colo.
206, 34 Pac. 997 (1893) ; Blythe v. Cordingly, 20 Colo. App. 500, 80 Pac. 495
(1905).
ILL. STAT. ANN. (Callaghan, 1924) c. 76, par. 3; id. c. 98, par. 88; id. c. 110,
par. 39; Gage v. Mechanics' National Bank of Chicago, 79 Ill. 62 (1875) (joint
guarantors of promissory note held liable jointly and severally) ; Kaestner v.
First. Nat. Bank, 170 Ill. 322, 48 N. E. 998 (1897) (joint guarantors of prom.
note) ; Northeastern Coal Co. v. Tyrrell, 133 Ill. App. 472 at 477 (1907) (dictum construing c. 76, par. 3 as applying to negotiable instruments before the
N. I. L.); Harrison v. Thackaberry, 248 Ill. 512, 94 N. E. 172 (1911) (prom.
note, case cited Kaestner v. Bank as construing c. 76, par. 3 and did not decide point by c. 98, par. 88) ; Hochschild v. Goddard Tool Co., 233 Ill. App.
56 at 62 (1924) (says c. 98, par. 88 did not change the prior law in Illinois
that the obligation of a firm could not be set off against an individual claim of
one of the partners) ; Wisner v. Catherwood, 225 Ill. App. 471 (1922) (says
c. 110, par. 39 allowing discontinuance as to a joint defendant does not change
or modify the rule that an intermediate number of joint obligors, more than
one or less than all, cannot be sued upon the joint obligation).
Delaware has a statute which makes an obligation, or written contract,
of several persons joint and several, unless otherwise expressed, DEL. REv.
CoDE (1915) §2628; but the court refused to apply this statute in an action
against one of the joint makers of a negotiable promissory note and gave
judgment against the plaintiff, Gale v. Myers, 4 Houst. 546 (Del. 1873) ; but
even if the court had held that the statute applied and was intended to include
promissory notes, the question arises whether or not the words "we promise
to pay" expresses a specific intention to make it joint.
' CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) §1659.

MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, 1921) §7550; Wibaux v. Grinnell Live-Stock
Co., 9 Mont. 154, 22 Pac. 492 (1889).
N. D. ComP. LAws ANN. (1913) §5919.
OKLA. COMP. STAT. ANN. (Bunn, 1921) §5062; Outcault v. Collier, 8
Okla. 473, 58 Pac. 642 (1899) (prom. note) (says that obligations appearing
to be joint will be presumed to be joint and several until such presumption is
in some manner overcome, thus seeming to add a further judicial presumption
to that raised by the statute) ; Schowalter v. Beard, 10 Okla. 454, 63 Pac. 687
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three of them have restricted this statute by providing that ordinarily
an obligation imposed upon several persons is presumed to be joint
and not several unless it comes within the class just mentioned. 2 '
Another group of states has both procedural and substantive law
statutes which not only declare that a joint contract is to be deemed
joint and several but also expressly provide that a: plaintiff may sue
22
any one or more of joint contractors.
(1900) ; MeMarter v. City Nat. Bank of Lauton, 23 Okla. 550, 101 Pac. 1103,

138 Am. St 831-n. (1909)

(prom. note, construes other statutes in connection

with §5062); Continental Gin Co. v. Huff, 25 Okla. 798, 108 Pac. 369 (1910)
(prom. note); Rutherford v. Holbert, 42 Okla. 735, 142 Pac. 1099 (1914)
(contract) ; Bilby v. Gibson, 133 Okla. 196, 271 Pac. 1026 (1928) (contract).

S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) §889.
Civ. CoDE (Deering, 1931) §1431; Harrison v. McCormick, 69 Cal.
616, 11 Pac. 456 (1886) (contract); Farmers' Exch. Bank v. Morse, 129
Cal. 239, 61 Pac. 1088 (1900) (held that in the case of a note joint in form,
made under an agreement in terms joint, no intention to make the note joint
and several appearing, the presumption of §1659, upra note 20, will not be
indulged, but the note will be treated as joint and hence all parties thereto
must be made defendants in an action thereon) ; Bartlett Estate Co. v. Fraser,
11 Cal. App. 373, 105 Pac. 130 (1909) (held that a note reading "we promise
to pay" was a joint note and had to be enforced according to its express
terms). However, in Leonard v. Leonard, 138 Cal. xix, 70 Pac. 1071 (1902)
it was held that where a note was given by two persons to obtain money for
the benefit of one of them, the obligation was joint as Well as several, §§1659
and 1431 being cited. Also, in Gummer v. Mairs, 140 Cal. 535, 74 Pac. 26
(1903), the court held that a writing signed by two persons who had purchased certain land, taking title in themselves, obligating them to pay an
additional sum therefor on specified conditions, was their joint and several
promise, bringing the case within §1659. Woods v. Berry, 111 Cal. App. 675,
296 Pac. 332 (1931) says that in an action on a joint obligation, all persons
jointly liable must be united as defendants. See also McKee v. Cunningham,
2 Cal. App. 684, 84 Pac. 260 (1906), and Bell v. Adams, 150 Cal. 772, 90
Pac. 118 (1907) (contract).
N. D. Comp. LAws ANN. (1913) §5767; Grovenor v. Signor, 10 N. D.
503, 88 N. W. 278 (1901) (prom. note with "we promise to pay" held joint) ;
Clements v. Miller, 13 N. D. 176, 100 N. W. 239 (1904) (court held that in
the absence of language in a contract showing a contrary intention, the obligations of parties to a contract are presumed to be joint and not several) ; see
also, supra note 20.
S. D. Comp. LAWS (1929) §725; Central Banking and Trust Co. v. Posey,
22 S. D. 223, 116 N. W. 1126 (1908) (it was assumed in the case that a
promissory note signed by several people was joint and not joint and several).
See also supra note 20.
1 ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §5719; Duramus v. Harrison & Whitman, 26
Ala. 326 (1855) (prom. note); Willis v. Neal, 39 Ala. 464 (1864) (prom.
note) ; Lewis v. Grace, 44 Ala. 307 (1870) (prom. note) ; McKee v. Griffin,
60 Ala. 427 (1877) (official bond); Steed v. McIntyre, 68 Ala. 407 (1880)
(contract) ; Steed v. Barnhill, 71 Ala. 157 (1881) (prom. note) ; Carothers v.
Callahan, 207 Ala. 611, 93 So. 569 (1922) (prom. note).
District of Columbia, see supra note 18.
KAN. R-v. ST. ANiN. (1923) §§16-101, 16-104; Board Comm'rs. Jefferson Co. v. Swain, 5 Kan. 225 (1870) (contract) ; Rose v. Williams, 5 Kan.
292 at 296 (1870) (prom. note) ; Prints v. Jacobin, 12 Kan. 50 at 55 (1873)
(prom. note); Whitlanhall v. Korber, 12 Kan. 618 (1874) (prom. note);
"' CA.
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The confusion which exists on this point because of the number of variations among the several state- concerning this subject
can readily be seen. In view of the purpose of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to obtain uniform
laws throughout the United "States,23 it seems that the problem of
the joinder of joint obligors, including not only those who make
joint negotiable instruments but also those who make other joint
contracts, should be dealt with by it more fully than has been done
in the present Uniform Joint Obligations Act and Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act.
Section 2 of the Uniform Joint Obligations Act provides that "a
judgment against one or more of several obligors, or against one or
more of joint, or of joint and several obligors shall not discharge a coobligor who was not a party to the proceeding wherein the judgment was rendered." 24 It appears that this Act has not gone far
enough in dealing with the aforementioned confusion and in resolving it into a uniform rule. This could be attained by changing the
Act so as to read:
"All contracts which, by the
common law, are joint only, shall be con25
strued to be joint and several."

Furthermore, the pertinent section of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides only that "joint payees or joint indorsees who
indorse are deemed to indorse jointly and severally."' 26 Illinois and
Howard v. Yost, 6 Kan. App. 374, 50 Pac. 1098 (1897) (release of one joint
maker does not release any of the others) ; Bank of Topeka v. Eaton, 95 Fed.
355 (C. C. D. Mass. 1899) (contract).
Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1929) §§2953, 2956; McElroy v. Ford, 81 Mo. App. 500
(1899) ; State v. Flora, 109 Mo. 293, 19 S. W. 95 (1892) (prom. note);
Bagnell Timber Co. v. Mo., K. & I. Ry. Co., 242 Mo. 11, 145 S. W. 469
(1912) (contract); McArthur v. Fruit Supply Co., 191 S. W. 1126 (Mo. 1917)
(contract); Welch-Sandler Cement Co. v. Mullins, 31 S. W. (2d) 86 (Mo.
1930).
N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) §§105-110, 105-112.
TENN. ANN. CODE (Williams, Shannon, Harsh, 1932) §§8611, 8613; Sully
v. Campbell, 99 Tenn. 434, 42 S. W. 15 (1897) (prom. note).
W. VA. CODE (1930) c. 46, art. 5, §9; id. c. 55, art. 8, §7. See also supra
note 9.
' Its constitution, art. I, §2, says that "its object shall be to promote uniformity in state laws on all subjects where uniformity is deemed desirable
and practicable." HANDBOOK OF TE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (1932) 542; id. 540.
219 U. L. A. 215.
'This is the form of the pertinent statute in Kansas and Missouri. KAN.
REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) §16-101; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) §2155.
15 U. L. A. 472; BRANNAN, THE NEOrIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED (5th ed. 1932) 33. For minor and erroneous variations of the language
of this section, see ibid.
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West Virginia have settled the questions concerning the joinder or
non-joinder of parties to negotiable paper by amending the last part
of this section so as to make all joint parties jointly and severally
liable. 27 The statute as enacted by these two states has taken away
the arbitrary distinction made between joint payees and joint indorsees on the one hand and joint makers, drawers, and acceptors on
the other 28 and tends to make joint notes more readily negotiable
by making them more easily collectible. It has also achieved a simplification of procedure.
It is submitted that the last sentence of Section 68 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act be amended so as to read:
"All parties jointly liable on a negotiable instrument are deemed to be
jointly and severally liable.' '29

ROBERT H. SCHNELL.
Contracts-Sufficiency of Consideration for Industrial
Pension.
The president of a corporation wrote an old employee on the day
of his retirement, commending him for his fine service and stating
that he would receive $100 per month as long as he maintained his
"present attitude of loyalty to the company and its officers" and
was "not engaged in any competitive occupation." Payments were
made from 1927 until 1931, when plaintiff was notified that the company no longer intended to continue them. Plaintiff did not enter any
occupation. Suit is based on the letter as a contract. The lower
court sustained, and the upper overruled a demurrer.1
Four possible legal effects are inherent in such a letter: (1) It
may be a conditional gratuity which is not binding.2 (2) It may be
'ILL. STAT. ANN. (Callaghan, 1924) c. 98, par. 88; W. VA. CODE (1930)
c. 46, art. 5, §9.
"See (1900) 14 HARv. L. Rsv. 241, 252, and (1901) 10 YALE L. J.84, 94, as
to the Ames-Brewster Controversy concerning the N. I. L. Specific amendments to the N. I. L. have been suggested by Ames in (1903) 16 HARV. L. Rv.
255, by Britton in (1928) 22 ILL. L. Rxv. 815, and by Kent in (1928) 22 ILL. L.
REv. 833, but apparently they have overlooked the desirability and necessity of
amending §68.
'As in Illinois, supra note 27.
"Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 161 Atl. 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).
2 Kirsey v. Kirsey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (promise to support widowed sisterin-law and her children). Contra: Prince v. Alabama State Fair, 106 Ala.
340, 17 So. 449, 28 L. R. A. 716 (1895) (promise to send a picture for exhibition); Richards Ex'rs. v. Richards, 46 Pa. 78 (1863) (promise to furnish
money to a friend to complete payments on land). I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(1st ed. 1920) 330, §148.

